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Abstract 
The impact of the legal framework for the consents process on the rate of 
development of offshore wind farms in England, and the achievement of 
targets for renewable electricity generation have been reviewed. From the 
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literature and consulted stakeholders it was found that the complexity of the 
current consents process has adversely affected the rate of development 
and the achievement of renewable energy targets. Future projects will be 
subject to a different legal framework for consents, under the Planning Act 
2008 and the Marine and Coastal Access Bill. From a comparison of process 
diagrams for the current and future consents processes, it is concluded that 
the future process should be an improvement. However, uncertainties remain 
about the detailed procedures and operation of the future consenting 
authorities. The capacity and capability of key stakeholders to meet their 
obligations have implications for the time frame for the processes of applying 
for, and the granting of, consents. Furthermore improved engagement from 
developers and clarity about the role of local authorities are essential if 
progress is to be made. The need for a holistic and strategic view of the 
industry, including associated development of the supply chain and the 
transmission grid, is also highlighted. 
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1. Introduction 
The United Kingdom (UK) is subject to a legally binding European target to 
obtain 15% of its energy requirements (heat, electricity and transport) from 
renewable technologies by 2020 (BWEA, 2008a; DECC, 2009c). 
Furthermore the Climate Change Act (HM Parliament, 2008a) imposes a 
legally binding target, to reduce carbon dioxide emissions to 20% of 1990 
levels by 2050. The generation of electricity from renewable sources is being 
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seen as fundamental to achieving these targets (DECC, 2009c; Venables, 
2008). 
Climate change is one of three key drivers for renewable electricity 
generation; the others are security of supply and affordability (Fig. 1.) (DTI, 
2007; Sellick, 2008). Additional pressure comes from the age of the existing 
fossil and nuclear electricity generating fleet, which needs to be replaced 
within 50 years (Clarke, 8th June 2009). Furthermore the UK’s energy needs 
are forecast to grow, requiring an additional 30-35GW of new capacity by 
2030 (DTI, 2007). 
 
Fig. 1.  The drivers for renewal energy (adapted from (DTI, 2007; Sellick, 2008)) 
The UK has some of the best offshore wind resources in the world 
(Sustainable Development Commission, 2005), and offshore wind farms are 
being heralded as major contributors to the UK’s electricity generation mix 
after 2010 (BWEA, 2008a; DECC, 24/6/09). Wind turbine technology is a 
proven technology and has been applied offshore with some success. 
Following two rounds of licensing in 2000 and 2003, the UK has the largest 
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fleet of operational wind farms in the world (BVG Associates, 2009), with a 
generating capacity of almost 600MW (BWEA, 2008b).  
Round 1 and 2 development, however, has not proceeded at the rate initially 
envisaged; this required some 4.5-5.5GW of operating capacity by 2010 
(Burke, 2004; DTI, 2002). If the UK is to achieve its 2020 target, a step 
change in the rate of development is needed. The challenges facing 
development are complex, but fall broadly into five categories: project 
economics, technical constraints, supply chain capacity, social effects, 
namely to amenity and aesthetics, and environmental impacts (Sustainable 
Development Commission, 2005; Haggett, 2008). The legal framework for 
offshore wind farm development consent must address all these aspects.  
The third round of offshore wind farm leasing was announced by The Crown 
Estate on 4th June 2008, with a target of a further 25GW of installed 
generating capacity by 2020 (The Crown Estate, 2008b). On the 24th June 
2009, following consultation on the Strategic Environmental Assessment 
(SEA) for UK Offshore Energy (DECC, 2009b) the UK government gave the 
go ahead to proceed with this third round in England and Wales (DECC, 
24/6/09; Lord Hunt of Kings Heath OBE, Jun 2009), with a view to granting 
leases by the end of 2009 (The Crown Estate, 2009). These ambitious plans 
represent a £100bn challenge and opportunity (Clarke, 8th June 2009) for 
the UK economy, and a potential 70,000 jobs in a new industry (DECC, 
24/6/09; Carbon Trust, 2008). 
Round 3 wind farms will be subject to a different consenting process from the 
earlier rounds. The Planning Act 2008 (HM Parliament, 2008b) and the 
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Marine and Coastal Access Bill (DEFRA, 2008b) will provide a new legal 
framework for the consents process. 
This paper will present the findings of a research project looking at the 
development of the offshore wind industry in England. The research focus 
was the legal framework for consents for offshore wind farms, and its 
implications for the rate of development, to date and into the future. The aim 
was to answer the question: 
Is the legal framework for consents helping or hindering offshore wind 
farm development, and achievement of the targets for renewable 
energy generation? 
The approach adopted was to: 
 explore the experience to date of the licensing and consenting 
process for offshore wind farms in Rounds 1 and 2;  
 gain an understanding of and explain the future consents process for 
Round 3;  
 identify, categorise and consult stakeholders in the process, and 
analyse their perceptions of the consents process; 
 assess whether the new process will successfully address shortfalls in 
the earlier process.  
Due to differing legal regimes in the devolved assemblies in the UK, the 
project focussed on offshore wind farm development in England. 
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The research methodology is described in the next section. Our findings are 
set out in the following section, which presents the time frame for offshore 
wind projects and the results of stakeholder analysis for the consents 
process. An analysis of the legal framework for future consents, including 
process diagrams for the current and future consenting processes, follows, 
and then the results of a survey of stakeholders’ perceptions of the consents 
process are described. The findings are discussed in the subsequent section 
before conclusions are drawn and further work recommended. 
2. Methodology 
Internet research sought to construct a time frame for the consents process 
for Round 1 and 2 projects including forecast completion date for incomplete 
projects. Primary data sources consulted included the websites for wind farm 
developers and news archives. Whilst this approach the gave increased 
understanding of the extent of offshore wind farm development in England 
and Wales, due to time limitations and lack of data in the public domain, it 
was only possible to construct a typical timeline, rather than detailed time 
lines for each project. 
Round 3 wind farm projects will be subject to a different legal regime to 
rounds 1 and 2. To gain a full understanding of the new consents regime, an 
analysis of the Planning Act 2008, and the Marine and Coastal Access Bill 
was undertaken. Drawing on the Government’s own guidance that 
regulations should be written so that they are easily understood, 
implemented and enforced; that regulators should be accountable for the 
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efficiency and effectiveness of their activities; and that regulatory activity 
should allow, or even encourage, economic development (Hampton, 2005), 
This analysis sought to identify whether the new legal framework addresses 
the shortfalls in the previous consenting process identified by stakeholders in 
interview. 
Stakeholder organisations were identified through the literature review and 
internet research. These were recorded in a stakeholder analysis tool 
developed for the UK Rural Economy and Land Use (RELU) programme 
(Graves and Morris, 2007). Using an “analytical categorisation” approach 
(Reed et al., 2009), stakeholders were ranked by consideration of the 
question:  
"Which individuals and organisations (i.e. stakeholders) have "Interest 
in" and "Influence over" over the leasing and consents process for 
offshore wind farms?”  
Rankings were made in accordance with the criteria defined by (Graves and 
Morris, 2009). Through this process it was possible to identify the “key 
players” and “context setters” in the consents process in addition to the 
“subjects” and “crowd” (Reed et al., 2009). This approach facilitated the 
identification of organisations for subsequent interview, with the intention that 
each of these groups be represented. 
To gain an understanding of perceptions of the consents process across the 
industry, a series of telephone interviews was conducted. The questionnaire 
comprised three sections. The first section comprised closed and open 
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questions to confirm the respondent organisation’s interest in and influence 
over the consents process, and hence their position on the stakeholder 
analysis plot. The second section comprised open questions to investigate 
the respondent organisation’s experience of the consents process during 
round 1 and 2. The open questions gave respondents freedom to answer in 
their own words and flexibility to speak about issues of specific concern to 
their organisation, which may not be relevant to all stakeholders (Gill and 
Johnson, 2002). Further open questions in the third section sought to 
understand the perceptions of the new process for round 3, both in terms of 
improvements and limitations. 
Interviews were conducted by telephone rather than face to face, to reduce 
travel costs and time demand (Robson, 2002). Organisations were selected 
to be representative of a cross section of stakeholders at various interest and 
influence levels, from each of the groups of “key players, context setters, 
subjects and crowd” (Reed et al., 2009; Graves and Morris, 2009). An initial 
email introduced the survey and expectations, and requested to arrange a 
telephone interview with the relevant representative of the stakeholder 
organisation. Due to potential commercial sensitivities, the initial email 
included assurance that respondents might remain anonymous in the final 
thesis documents (Gill and Johnson, 2002). 
Telephone interviews were conducted with organisations responding 
positively to the request, and followed the questionnaire. Where interesting 
themes were identified, these were explored more deeply using structured 
interview techniques (Robson, 2002). Whilst telephone interviews allowed 
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data to be collected from a range of geographically dispersed stakeholders, 
at relatively low cost, the disadvantages of this method of data collection are 
that it is more difficult to build rapport, and there may be problems with 
interpretation when compared to face to face interviews (Robson, 2002).  
Data collection took place from late June to mid August 2009. Following the 
go-ahead to Round 3 on 24th June, this was a busy time in the offshore wind 
industry, as well as being a holiday period. This may account for some of the 
difficulties experienced in arranging telephone interviews with stakeholder 
organisations. As a back-up to telephone interviews, an online version of the 
questionnaire was developed. This was offered as an alternative to 
telephone interviews towards the end of the data collection period. The 
online questionnaire provided a means to obtain data from a broader range 
of stakeholders; however this data was more limited than that provided from 
telephone interviews, due to the lack of personal interaction and involvement 
(Robson, 2002).  
The bulk of the data collected was qualitative data, which was subject to 
analysis by the following steps (Robson, 2002; Miles and Huberman, 1994):  
 transcribing of interview; 
 summarising of contact; 
 coding interview responses; 
 analysis of responses. 
Follow up emails were sent to a selection of stakeholders to validate theories 
developed from the survey findings. 
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3. Findings 
Time frame for offshore wind farm development 
Internet research provided data to compile the projected growth in offshore 
wind generating capacity from rounds 1 and 2 wind farms, against 
Government targets (Fig. 2.);  
 
Fig. 2.  Projected growth of offshore wind energy capacity of the UK from 
Round 1 and 2 projects (as envisaged at August 2009). Compiled from 
project completion dates established through internet research.  
This confirms the expectations of the industry (BWEA and Garrad Hassan, 
2009b). The rate of offshore wind farm construction will increase significantly 
over the next five years, with the final capacity from Round 2 coming on line 
by 2015. The total capacity at this time is forecast to be of the order of 8GW. 
 11 
Using the same data, a summary time line for Round 2 wind farms has been 
compiled (Fig. 3.).  
 
Fig. 3.  Summary of timeline for Round 2 offshore wind projects 
Our observations from the timeline for Round 2 projects are: 
 it took approximately two years to submit the earliest consent 
applications; 
 consent applications and environmental statements (ES) are still to be 
submitted for a small number of  projects, with the last forecast to be 
submitted in 2010; 
 the earliest consent was granted in 2006, and  it has taken around two 
years to grant consent; on this basis, consent for the final wind farm 
may not be granted until 2012; 
 construction starts approximately two years after gaining consent, and 
construction may take a further two years to complete.  
Dec 2003 
Agreement 
for lease 
2006 -2012 
Consents 
granted 
2008 – 2014 
Start 
construction 
2010 – 2015 
Finish 
construction 
2015 
Round 2 
delivered 
2005 - 2010 
Submission of 
environmental 
statements 
 12 
By comparison Round 1 wind farms, considered as demonstration projects, 
experienced a faster consenting process and much shorter overall project 
duration (BWEA, 2008a). 
Analysis of the legal framework for the consents process 
The consents process for Round 1 and 2 offshore wind farms has been 
described in detail by Dower et al., 2002; Gray et al., 2005; Pettersson, 2008; 
Scott, 2006; Trinick, 2006 and others. There are two possible consenting 
routes: section 36 of the Electricity Act (HM Parliament, 1989) or section 3 of 
the Transport and Works Act (HM Parliament, 1992). The majority of Round 
1 and 2 consent applications have been made under the section 36 route, 
since the amendment of the Electricity Act, by the Energy Act (HM 
Parliament, 2004), to allow for the creation of exclusion zones around 
offshore wind farm installations.  
A process diagram of the section 36 consents process has been derived and 
is presented in Fig. 4.This clearly shows the complexity of the current 
process. Offshore wind farms require some six separate consents, 
depending on the extent of the development, which are considered by four 
different consenting bodies. There is potential that the different consenting 
bodies will reach different decisions on whether to grant consent, and the 
timescales are inconsistent (DEFRA, 2008a). Although there is an intention 
to bring the consideration of consents for offshore works together at a 
national government level (Pettersson, 2008), the onshore works fall within 
the jurisdiction of local planning authorities. This can result in delays to 
 13 
projects, when local authorities decline planning permission, which may then 
become subject to public enquiry (Jay, 2008). 
Round 3 projects will be subject to a different consenting regime to their 
predecessors. The Planning Act (HM Parliament, 2008b) and the Marine and 
Coastal Access Bill (DEFRA, 2008b), currently under consideration by 
Parliament, provide a new legislative framework for the consents process. 
The generating capacity of the wind farm determines which legislation is 
applicable to a given consent application. Developments with a capacity 
greater than 100MW will be subject to consideration and decision by the 
Infrastructure Planning Commission under the Planning Act 2008, whilst 
smaller projects will be determined by the Marine Management Organisation 
under the Marine and Coastal Access Bill. The introduction of different 
consenting regimes, with different decision making bodies,  for developments 
of different sizes decreases consistency, integrity and uniformity, and  
breaches the best practice requirements for permitting regimes as set out by 
(DEFRA, 2009).  
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Fig. 4.  Section 36 consents process for Round 1 and 2 offshore wind farms 
Electricity Act 1989 s.36 consents process for offshore wind farms, capacity > 1MW
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The Planning Act 2008 
The Planning Act (HM Parliament, 2008b) intends to provide a more 
efficient, accessible and transparent planning system for significant 
infrastructure projects (DCLG, 2009). The Act seeks to improve the 
consenting process by reducing the number of consents required and 
elevating planning decision-making from local level to national level, and 
hence reduce time and costs associated with obtaining development 
consent (Pitt, 2009). Under section 15(3) of the new Planning Act, large 
offshore wind farms, with capacity greater than 100MW, will be considered 
Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects (NSIP). The majority of Round 
3 projects will have capacity greater than 100MW (Wilson and Triggs, 
2008), so will require development consent under this Act. This cut-off 
figure of 100MW appears somewhat arbitrary; with current technology this 
could be achieved with as few as 30 turbines. 
Part 1 of the Act establishes a new body, the Infrastructure Planning 
Commission (IPC), with responsibility for making planning decisions for 
NSIP. The IPC will be independent of government and able to make 
“transparent, expert, accountable and ethical decisions” (Pitt, 2009). The 
IPC will be guided by National Policy Statements (NPS) (HM Parliament, 
2008b) part 2), which set the policy framework for planning decisions in 
specified fields of development, namely: energy, transport, water, waste 
water and waste (section 14(6)). NPSs will be prepared by the Secretary 
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of State with responsibility for the field of development, and must take into 
consideration the requirement to achieve sustainable development.  
In defining the NPS, there is a duty on the Secretary of State to carry out 
appropriate consultation and publicity (section 7). In defining the 
consultation requirements, the Secretary of State must consult with local 
authorities affected by the NPS (section 8).  With respect to offshore wind 
farm development, however, it is unclear which local authorities will be 
consulted. The Act refers to local authorities where development is to be 
made, and those neighbouring them, however local authority jurisdiction 
does not extend offshore (Jay, 2008). There is potential that all local 
authorities along the coast could be affected by offshore wind farm 
developments, which represents a vast constituency for consultation in 
preparing the NPS. Local authorities representing ports or industrial areas 
are liable to be supportive of offshore wind where they benefit the local 
economy. By contrast, those in areas dependent on tourism may be 
concerned about negative effects on the local economy. These conflicts 
will need to be managed within a context of achieving sustainable 
development, as defined in section 10 of the Act, namely the mitigation of 
climate change and the achievement of good design. The need to mitigate 
climate change implies a predisposition to decisions in favour of offshore 
wind. 
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A process diagram of the future consents process for offshore wind farms 
has been derived (Fig. 5). The significant differences compared to the 
process for Rounds 1 and 2 are: 
 zonal development agreements (ZDA) between The Crown Estate 
and developers, with the Crown Estate acting in partnership with 
developers in obtaining development consent (The Crown Estate, 
2008a); 
 formal acceptance of the consent application by the IPC only after 
completion of all statutory consultations and provision of all required 
documents (part 5 chapter 2); 
 development consent replaces requirement to obtain consents 
under s.36 and s.37 of the Electricity Act 1989, and planning 
permission (section 33 (1a,  h)); 
 defined timescales of 6 months for examination of the application 
(section 98) and 3 months for decision on the application (section 
107). 
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Fig. 5.  Proposed process for new consents, as it is anticipated will apply to Round 3 offshore wind farms (capacity >100 
MW) 
 
Consents process for Round 3 wind farms, capacity > 100MW
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From a comparison of Figs 4 and 5, it appears that the 2008 Planning Act 
does streamline the consents process. The process seems easier for 
stakeholders to understand, and to be integrated; it is more linear with 
fewer stages and fewer actors. There are, however, a number of concerns 
about its detailed application, particularly with respect to the time frames 
for the various stages of the process.  
The emphasis is on the developer, in partnership with The Crown Estate, 
to complete the pre-application process including full consultation and 
environmental assessment, before the application for development will be 
accepted for consideration by the IPC. Section 42 imposes a duty to 
consult local authorities about proposed developments, and developers 
are also required to consult with local authorities with respect to how they 
plan to consult local communities (section 47). There is no definition of 
consultation (UKELA, 2009), which may lead to different approaches by 
different developers, and subsequently challenges to the process. It is to 
be hoped that the involvement of the Crown Estate will provide some 
consistency of approach.  
As with consultation for the NPS, the extent of involvement of local 
authorities in the pre-application phase is unclear. Again the Act refers to 
local authorities where development is to be made, and those 
neighbouring them. The same conflicts with regards to industrial and 
tourist economies apply. Furthermore, the visual impact of the large wind 
farms planned for Round 3 may affect a number of different local 
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authorities along a coastline, presenting potential for considerable local 
political conflict, and challenge to the process. The visual impact of 
offshore wind farms on coastal communities is a complicated issue and 
widely discussed in the literature (Haggett, 2008; Jay, 2008; Ladenburg 
and Dubgaard, 2007; Ladenburg, 2008; Ladenburg and Dubgaard, 2009; 
Ladenburg, 2009b; Ladenburg, 2009a; Santora et al., 2004)  
Timescales for publicising and consulting on the development proposal 
are also unclear (section 48). Section 45 specifies a minimum time frame 
for consultation with local authorities of 28 days, but no maximum time 
frame. Section 47 similarly specifies 28 days consultation with local 
authorities on how they intend to consult local people, but is silent on the 
time frame for public consultation. Furthermore section 48 is silent on the 
time frame for publicity. This opens a further possibility for legal challenge 
to the process. 
Whilst there is an objective for the IPC to decide development consent 
applications within a 9 month time frame (sections 98 and 107), there is 
substantial flexibility to extend this. Section 55 allows the IPC 28 days to 
decide whether to accept an application. Thereafter, section 88 allows for 
an initial assessment meeting, with no real time limitations, which sets the 
start date for the 6 month examination phase. There is potential for this 
meeting to extend over more than one day, in which case it is the last day 
that sets the start date. Both consideration and decision phases may be 
extended by the appropriate authority under sections 98(4) and 107(3) 
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respectively. Chapters 6 and 7 introduce further uncertainty into the time 
frames for the consents process, by allowing for suspension of the 
process and intervention by the Secretary of State. These provisions 
reduce the potential for the IPC to be accountable for ensuring that its 
activities are effective and efficient, as required by the government’s own 
guidance on better regulation (Hampton, 2005).  
In parallel to the application for consent to the IPC, the developer may also 
be required to apply to the MMO for a Marine Bill License for wind farms of 
capacity greater than 100MW, although this may be deemed under the 
Planning Act development consent. The Marine Bill will be considered 
further in the following section. 
The Marine and Coastal Access Bill 
Consent applications for Round 3 offshore wind farms with capacity less 
than 100MW will be subject to the provisions of the Marine and Coastal 
Access Bill (DEFRA, 2008b). The Bill introduces similar reforms to marine 
planning as the new Planning Act does to land based planning (Wilson 
and Triggs, 2008). It seeks to address the increasing anthropogenic 
demands on marine resources, including navigation, oil and gas, dredging 
for aggregates and fisheries, as well as offshore renewable energy and 
Marine Conservation Zones. 
Part 1, Chapter 1 of the Bill proposes the establishment of a new 
organisation, the Marine Management Organisation (MMO), with 
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responsibility for managing the marine environment around England. The 
MMO would also be responsible for the entire UK offshore area, for those 
functions not devolved to the National Assemblies. These responsibilities 
will include research, regulation, planning, harbour construction and 
alteration consents, and Marine Act licensing. In creating this new body, 
the Bill goes against the recommendation of the Hampton Review that 
activities be undertaken by existing organisations where possible 
(Hampton, 2005).  
Part 4 of the bill seeks to simplify the license regime by consolidating two 
of the six consents currently required, those under Food and Environment 
Protection Act (FEPA) section 5 (HM Parliament, 1985) and Coast 
Protection Act (CPA) section 34 (HM Parliament, 1949), into one Marine 
Act license. For offshore renewable energy installations, Part 1 Chapter 2 
of the Bill transfers Electricity Act section 36 licensing to the MMO so it can 
grant all necessary consents for small offshore energy projects (less 
than100MW). The transfer of Electricity Act consenting to a body with no 
direct responsibility for electricity generation appears flawed, even if only 
for small scale projects. There appears to be a conflict of interest between 
the MMO’s role in managing the marine environment overall and this 
involvement in consenting.  
One of the significant changes to be brought in with the bill will be the 
introduction of marine planning (part 3). Long term objectives will be 
outlined in a Marine Policy Statement (MPS), on which the MMO will base 
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its decisions, much as the IPC will base its decisions on NPS.  The MPS 
will provide a framework for regional marine plans (section 49), which will 
contain the policies for sustainable development within the area to which 
they apply. The MPS will consider all aspects of the marine environment 
and its use, and will need to be consistent with the NPS. 
It is intended, that the IPC and MMO will work closely on all offshore 
renewable energy projects (DEFRA, 2008a). Under section 23 of the Bill 
the MMO is made a statutory consultee for all IPC development consents 
and the MMO will be responsible for enforcement of development 
consents approved by the IPC. This implies a significant role for the MMO, 
which will need to be structured to support this. 
Stakeholder Analysis 
Forty different organisations or groupings of organisations, having a stake 
in the offshore wind farm consents process, were identified from the 
review of the literature and internet research. These were ranked for 
interest in and influence over the process. The results of this initial ranking 
are shown in Fig. 6, which divides the stakeholders into the different 
stakeholder groups: key players, context setters, subjects and crowd. 
Stakeholders are further categorised by the nature of their activity: 
government, industry, NGO, local interest and other user.  
Key players are the major actors in the offshore wind farm consenting 
hence determining the success of the process (Graves and Morris, 2009). 
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The key players were identified to be regulators or consenting authorities 
(government), developers (industry) and statutory environmental 
consultees (NGOs). 
Context setters have a low level of interest on offshore wind farm 
development, but represent a significant risk to the process where they are 
in disagreement with the objective, as they have high level of influence 
(Reed et al., 2009). They include aviation interests (other users), other 
government bodies, and the transmission and distribution network 
operator (industry).  
Subjects have a high level of interest in the consents process, but have 
little influence over it (Reed et al., 2009; Graves and Morris, 2009). They 
may be either supportive or unsupportive to the process. Supporters 
include consultants to developers for the consents process and trade  
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Fig 6:  Plot of stakeholder interest in and influence over the consents process for offshore wind farms, with stakeholders 
categorised by role, and stakeholder group 
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 organisations (industry), local development agencies (LDAs) and ports 
(local interest). Those against potentially include local fishermen, leisure 
sailors and representatives of other local interests. 
Stakeholders categorised as the crowd have neither interest in the 
consents process nor influence over it (Graves and Morris, 2009). As well 
as representatives of other uses including shipping lines and fisheries, 
these include subcontractors to the wind farm industry. 
Stakeholder views 
Firstly stakeholders were asked to give their own assessment of interest 
and influence in the consents process. A comparison of the initial 
assessment and with the stakeholders self assessment is given in Table 1. 
The rankings from the original assessment were largely confirmed except 
for the following significant movements: 
 developers move from being key players to subjects; 
 local planning authorities move from key players to crowd;  
 ports move from subjects to crowd. 
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Table 1: Comparison of stakeholder groups between initial assessment and stakeholder self assessment of interest in and 
 influence over the consents process for offshore wind farms, with analysis of survey respondents by stakeholder group 
 
Key players Context setters Subjects Crowd
Initial assessment DECC
MFA
Developers
Local planning authority
DEFRA
The Crown Estate
Environment Agency
BIS
JNCC
Natural England
OFGEM
DfT
DCLG
CAA
National Grid
MoD
BWEA
EWEA
Consultants (consents)
The Carbon Trust
Ports
Local fishermen
Leisure sailors
Parish council 
Local population
LDAs
O&M contractors
Local businesses
Local protest groups
Jacking vessels
NFFO
Civil contractors
Consultants (technical)
Commercial fisheries
Component suppliers
Shipping lines
Support vessels
IMO
Turbine manufacturers
Stakeholder self assessment DECC
MFA
BWEA
DEFRA
The Crown Estate
Environment Agency
JNCC
Natural England
DfT
DCLG
CAA
National Grid
MoD
BIS
Developers
EWEA
Consultants (consents)
The Carbon Trust
Local fishermen
Leisure sailors
Parish council 
Local population
LDAs
RSPB
NFFO
O&M contractors
Local businesses
Local protest groups
Jacking vessels
Civil contractors
Consultants (technical)
Commercial fisheries
Component suppliers
Shipping lines
Support vessels
IMO
Turbine manufacturers
Ports
OFGEM
Local planning authority
Number of respondents 6 2 5 7
Note: stakeholder group for number of respondents assigned on basis of initial assessment
 With regard to Round 1 and 2 the issues cited most frequently by 
stakeholders as causing delay to the consents process were: 
environmental assessments and procedures (key players & subjects), 
influence of other users and consultation. Specifically the division of the 
consenting process, between local decision makers and national 
authorities was the most cited issue for the process. The impact on radar 
was the major issue associated with other users such as aviation and 
shipping. There was, however, a general consensus that lessons have 
been learnt from the consents process for Round 1 and 2, and the issues 
are now largely understood by all parties. 
Although delay to project timeframes was the main concern amongst 
stakeholders, other factors were consent conditions and increased costs 
with negative impact on the economic viability of the project. Supply chain, 
technical (e.g. the grid) and environmental impact were also raised by 
some stakeholders. 
With regard to perceptions of the new consents process for Round 3, most 
of the stakeholders who responded could see improvements in 
procedures, the time frame for considering and deciding the application, 
and greater consistency on the basis of the NPS and a single consenting 
authority. 
However there were also views that there was scope for further 
improvements to the new consents process – especially in the areas of 
 process characteristics, environmental assessment, procedures and 
consent conditions. On the wider policy side, two particular issues were 
raised: (a) continuation of the Renewables Obligation, whereby power 
suppliers pay a penalty for each unit of electricity generated from non-
renewable sources, which are then recycled as subsidies for development 
of renewables (Klessmann et al., 2008; Toke, 2003)),as a means for 
improving the economic viability of projects; and (b) government support 
for industrialisation of the sector, including ports and the supply chain. 
4. Discussion and analysis of findings 
The research sought to develop an understanding of the legal framework 
for offshore wind farm consents and its implications for development.  
From Fig. 2, it is clear that to deliver all round 2 projects to achieve the 
8MW forecast for 2015 will require a step change in development, and a 
further step change to deliver the 25GW expected of round 3. Projects 
suffer delays at every stage, not only at consenting.  
Two major causes of delay identified were environmental assessments 
(EA) and procedures. EA delays resulted from having insufficient 
information to support the application and environmental statements (ES), 
requiring submission of supplementary environmental information, which 
may require additional survey work. It is necessary to understand the 
environmental impact of a new industry (Santora et al., 2004) and 
consultees argue that “upfront effort at scoping of the EA would have 
 prevented problems of the iterative process later”. There are, however, 
concerns from industry that “developers are made to collect data which 
are not strictly necessary for consents”.  
The consents process itself is described by one respondent as “incredibly 
laborious”.  Time tables are open ended and there is an impression that 
regulatory authorities can take as long as they like to make decisions.  
Ineffective communication between regulators and statutory bodies, high 
staff turnover and the under-resourcing of consultees and regulators are 
also contributing to the delays. Considering the complexity of the issues 
involved, however, the time frame is not considered unreasonable – and is 
much shorter than it could be for other infrastructure projects such as 
nuclear power stations. 
The third most significant issue in the consents process is the 
repercussions of development for other users of the sea, with the potential 
impact on aviation of radar clutter caused by turbines, obstruction to 
helicopter movements, and impacts on fishing and shipping being the 
most important (Plant, 2004; Plant, 2003). These issues are known to the 
stakeholders in the process and mitigation measures are being 
implemented (DECC, 2009a). 
Delayed consents increase the project risk profile and affect economic 
viability (Carbon Trust, 2008). They make it difficult to schedule resources 
and can impact on relationships between the different stakeholders. 
 Furthermore, delays to consents can mean that milestones agreed in 
lease documents become unrealistic.  
When consents have been granted, associated conditions can affect the 
economic viability of the project. Time limitations on construction activities 
to avoid disturbance during herring spawning season, can have the effect 
of reducing the available construction time during any given year to 8 
months – effectively increasing the construction time frame by one third. 
Furthermore these restrictions are applied inconsistently, respondents 
report blanket conditions being applied to areas well outside the spawning 
areas. There is concern that the precautionary approach to consents 
conditions does not reflect reality and that conditions need to be adapted 
on the basis of experience. 
There is a relationship between delays in consenting and subsequent 
delays to the project. As a growing industry with supply chain constraints, 
one respondent observes that the offshore wind industry “is a sellers’ 
market and suppliers will not enter into negotiation with developers until 
the project has consent.” There is a further complication with respect to 
grid connection, which must be planned well in advance of the project 
coming on-line, but must be justified against a consented development 
(Carbon Trust, 2008). 
Delays to development are not solely due to the direct or indirect effects of 
the consents process and consent conditions. Developers may choose to 
 progress one development ahead of another for their own reasons, 
including internal programmes, policy or resources. Other critical factors 
identified include investor confidence in current economic climate and the 
ability of the supply chain to support the huge growth in demand for high 
specification offshore turbines that is foreseen (Carbon Trust, 2006; 
Rowley and Westwood, 2003). 
Expectations for round 3 consents process 
The Planning Act 2008 does appear to streamline the consents process, 
as demonstrated by the process diagrams presented in Figs 4 and 5 of 
this paper. This is confirmed by the majority of respondents, although one 
did suggest “it will only cause more confusion”. 
The implications of the process are summarised by one respondent’s 
statement as: “more upfront burden on developers, but a clear time frame 
for consents”. Indeed the onus being on the developer to prepare and 
consult on the project proposal and the environmental statement prior to 
submitting the consent application to the IPC is considered by many to be 
a significant improvement. Although there is concern that there is a lack of 
guidance on what needs to be submitted with an application. 
The move away from the current consenting regime with multiple consents 
and consenting authorities (Trinick, 2006), to a single consenting authority 
with responsibility for granting all required consents is considered to be a 
major improvement; central decision making should build up consistency 
 and experience. The time frame for the IPC to consider and decide 
consent is also viewed as an improvement. However, given the uncertain 
application requirements, it is unclear whether the preparation of the 
application plus the nine months to determine consent will represent any 
significant improvement to the overall project time line.  
Furthermore there are a number of concerns about the detailed 
procedures and operation of the IPC which are seen as overly complicated 
or bureaucratic. There is a lack of clarity about onshore elements such as 
land fall of power and substations, as the Planning Act was not written 
specifically for offshore wind. Whilst the onshore elements are small they 
can have disproportionate impact on the overall project (Jay, 2008). 
The huge scale of round 3, together with other potential nationally 
significant infrastructure projects, represents a significant workload for a 
new organisation. There is concern that the IPC will not have the capacity 
to consider and decide all applications in the required time frame, 
particularly in the early years. It is considered essential the commissioners 
appointed by the IPC are of sufficient calibre and experience to make the 
decisions required of them. The potential for problems resulting from the 
inexperience of new organisations “with new people of unknown calibre, 
working to new rules and processes” was a common observation. A further 
concern is the possibility for legal challenge as the new system develops. 
 Statutory consultees observe that there is an onus them to get industry to 
involve them early in the process. They and the Marine Management 
Organisation (MMO), however, are faced with competing targets and 
obligations, particularly with their environmental responsibilities. 
Furthermore more and larger projects bring a greater risk of cumulative 
and in-combination effects, which need to be understood. The introduction 
of marine spatial planning under the Marine and Coastal Access Bill 
(DEFRA, July 2009) is welcomed as a means of addressing this, and 
enabling better understanding of potential impacts on other users 
(Douvere and Ehler, 2009). 
The supply chain and the transmission grid are both confirmed as critical 
factors for offshore wind farm development. There is no holistic, strategic 
approach to planning issues for development of the supply industry. 
Manufacturers and other businesses may need to expand premises to 
accommodate the demands of the new industry. Consents for such 
developments will remain in the hands of local decision makers, who may 
have limited knowledge of the needs of the industry. Development of ports 
to support the industry is also a significant factor, and concern was 
expressed that “wind farms will get approved but ports will be left in the 
slow lane” 
Furthermore a strategic approach to grid connection is needed (Farr, 
2009), as one respondent notes “good grid connections and a robust grid 
will effect all power sources going forward”. It is anticipated that the 
 National Policy Statements (NPS) will provide a framework against which 
to package grid development work (Carbon Trust, 2008). 
Politics and policy are significant factors in the success of the new system 
and the industry as a whole. In particular the need to continue the 
Renewable Obligation to improve the economic viability of projects (BWEA 
and Garrad Hassan, 2009a). NPS and Marine Policy Statements (MPS) to 
be produced subsequent to the passage of the Marine and Coastal 
Access Bill, will need to be consistent and provide a clear strategic 
direction.  
The importance of the sector as a growth area of the economy is being 
recognised in UK government policy (DECC, 2009c; DECC, 2009a). A 
general election is, however, expected within the next year. The 
Conservative party have stated that they will repeal the Planning Act 
should they come to power (The Conservative Party, 2009), adding 
uncertainty to the future for the consents process and increasing the risk 
associated with round 3 projects. 
Stakeholder engagement 
Self assessment by the stakeholders of their interest in and influence over 
the consents process largely confirms the author’s initial assessment. 
There are, however, some notable exceptions which provide insight into 
stakeholder engagement. 
 Government bodies largely fall into key players and context setters; they 
have the institutional power of decision or veto to the consents. The IPC 
and the MMO will fall into this category when they are established. All 
stakeholders with local interest fall on the boundary of subjects and crowd, 
indicating that they have similar, medium levels of interest in the process, 
which effects their local environment, but feel powerless over it. 
The self assessment of local authorities as members of the crowd, rather 
than key players as anticipated, is surprising given their current role as the 
consenting authority for onshore works. It suggests that local authorities 
consider they have low interest in and influence over the consents 
process. The limits to their jurisdiction (Jay, 2008) partly explain this. 
Furthermore one respondent reported a case where a local authority had 
refused planning permission for onshore works, only for that decision to be 
overturned by a higher authority. Another reason may be lack of 
engagement of local authorities by developers during the preparation of 
their consent application. Local authorities are, however, best placed to 
understand what is important to their communities (Jay, 2008). This 
reinforces the need for clarity about the role of local authorities in the 
future consents process. 
Industry stakeholders, being divided between subjects and crowd, have 
varying levels of interest in the process dependent on their position in the 
supply chain. They consider they have little power or influence over the 
 consents process and instead inherit the consequences of the process, 
either as delay to their project or conditions to the consent.  
The movement of developers from key players to subjects suggests that 
they believe that they have less influence over the consents process than 
anticipated. This is a cause for concern. Under the future consents 
process developers will need to take greater responsibility for progressing 
the pre-application phase and ensuring the completeness of the consent 
applications (DECC, 2009a). Failure to do so risks the application being 
rejected and significant delay to the project. 
The movement of ports to crowd from subjects indicates that they have a 
lower interest than anticipated. They join the majority of other suppliers to 
the industry. Ports, however, have a key role to play in future 
development, as highlighted by one respondent: “ports form the interface 
between manufacturing and offshore. Ports will need to develop to support 
wind farm developers, but the extent of development falls outside that 
defined as being of national significance in the Planning Act.”  Lack of 
consideration for the development of such support facilities and the supply 
chain may result in the transfer of these activities to other countries, and a 
missed opportunity for the UK economy (Carbon Trust, 2008).  
5. Conclusion 
The aim was to answer the question: 
 Is the legal framework for consents helping or hindering offshore 
wind farm development, and achievement of the targets for 
renewable energy generation? 
The study found that the current consents process has contributed to the 
slow rate of development of offshore wind farms, both directly and 
indirectly. Direct impacts include delays to the project as a result of the 
iterative submission of environmental data and increased costs for data 
collection. Indirect impacts have included the inability to agree supply 
contracts and grid connections until consents have been obtained, 
implications of delays on personnel turnover and relationships for all 
stakeholder organisations and the effects of consents conditions on the 
construction programme and project economic viability. As a consequence 
of these impacts the UK is struggling to meet its target for renewable 
energy generation. 
The new consents process under the Planning Act 2008 and Marine and 
Coastal Access Bill is more streamlined. It consolidates the consents 
required into a single development consent, which is granted by a single 
consenting authority, and provides a time frame for decision. There 
remain, however, many uncertainties about the detail of its operation. The 
procedures are unclear, and there is potential within the legislation to 
extend the time frame for decisions. Moreover, there are serious concerns 
about the capacity and capability of the key players, the Infrastructure 
Planning Commission (IPC), the Marine Management Organisation (MMO) 
 and statutory consultees to meet their obligations given the anticipated 
growth of infrastructure development in all fields. This has further 
implications for the time frame. 
The precise extent of local authority involvement must be clarified with 
some priority. There is substantial risk of legal challenges to the new 
process as it develops, particularly from populations affected by 
developments.  
By requiring the completion of the environmental assessment and 
consultation prior to submitting an application for development consent, 
the new process places the onus on developers to ensure the application 
is complete. Developers need to recognise that this makes them key 
players in the process and take responsibility for progressing the pre-
application phase for each project, if momentum is to be maintained. 
Without this, it is unclear whether the time frame for consenting decisions 
under the future legal framework will be any better. 
The boundaries for associated development to be consented by the IPC 
need to be clearly defined. Whilst this may increase the IPC’s workload 
associated with individual consent applications, it may take away the 
uncertainty associated with relying on local decision-makers.  Government 
needs to take a holistic and strategic view of the industry and consider 
how the consenting needs for associated development of ports and the 
industrialisation of the sector should be supported. Without this vision it is 
 difficult to see how their aspirations to achieve 70,000 new jobs and 
£100bn industry are to be realised.  
6. Further work 
In addition to the process diagram for the current and future consents 
process proposed by this paper, further work is required to clarify the 
detailed requirements for future consents applications. This may help 
address the lack of engagement with the process felt by developers. 
Further work to investigate the reasons for this and how to improve 
engagement would also be useful. Guidance on the role of local 
authorities affected by developments is also required.  
As round 3 progresses analysis of the actual time line for consent will 
confirm or otherwise the effectiveness of the future process. In order to 
establish whether the IPC will be able to achieve its aims of considering 
and deciding consents in the defined time frame, further work is required 
to assess the implications of all National Policy Statements, when issued, 
on demand for consents for nationally significant infrastructure projects 
(NSIP). In addition, consideration needs to be given to the boundaries of 
associated development for such projects and whether these extend to 
include planning and investment of support businesses and ports.  
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